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SEPARATION, ACCOMMODATION
AND THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND STATE*
Dallin H. Oaks**
There is a resurgence of scholarly interest in the law of church and state,
linked to a rising tide of cases raising such questions. The docket of the
United States Court currently (March, 1985) contains at least a half-dozen
cases that could be landmarks. Their subject matter includes school aid by
so-called "shared time,"' a moment of silence in public schools,2 equal access
for a high school religious club,3 religious objections to a driver's license
photograph, 4 sabbath observance by employees,5 and a religious exemption
from employment laws.6
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . . 7 After almost two centuries, the
meaning of this vitally important provision of the Bill of Rights still remains
uncertain. Its most critical term, religion, remains undefined.
Overall, the constitutional doctrine derived from the religion clause consists
* This article was adapted from Elder Oaks' speech delivered at the Annual Lecture Series
at DePaul University College of Law, Center for Church/State Studies, March 29, 1985.
** Member of the Council of the Twelve, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints;
former Professor of Law, The University of Chicago (1961-71); President, Brigham Young
University (1971-80); Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School (1975-80); and Justice,
Utah Supreme Court (1981-84).
The opinions in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily represent the
positions of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints or of The Center for Church/
State Studies of DePaul University's College of Law.
Professor W. Cole Durham of the J. Reuben Clark Law School and Jeanne Bryan lnouye
of the Utah Bar gave valuable assistance in the preparation of this lecture.
I. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids,
718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48 (2d
Cir.), juris. postponed sub nom. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 241 (1984).
2. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1 Ith Cir. 1983), prob. juris. noted,. 104 S. Ct. 1704
(1984).
3. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
53 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-773).
4. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Jensen v.
Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 79 (1984).
5. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), cert granted,
104 S. Ct. 1438 (1984).
6. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 290 (1984).
A seventh case, posing a variation of the validity of a nativity scene on public property,
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), was affirmed by an equally divided Court
just two days before this lecture was given. Board of Trustees of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 105
S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of what one scholar recently described as "contradictory principles, vaguely
defined tests, and eccentric distinctions." '
The prohibition against establishment seems to forbid government support
for religion, but the guarantee of free exercise seems to compel the very
same support. 9 In the relationship between government and religion, free
exercise seems to require accommodation, 0 while non-establishment forbids
it. These countervailing commands require comprehensive unifying principles
to guide their application to specific cases. The law still lacks such principles
for the religion clause.
The leading religion clause precedents are typically classified as "estab-
lishment" or "free exercise" cases. Neither classification has yet provided
the unifying principle necessary to resolve their apparent inconsistencies.
Professor Kurland of the University of Chicago was the first to suggest such
a principle. Kurland hypothesized that "government cannot utilize religion
as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit classifi-
cation in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.""
Kurland's principle of neutrality met with disfavor in the Supreme Court,
and other scholars tendered alternative principles.'" Most recently, Professor
Mansfield of Harvard University has suggested a single standard of decision
for both establishment and free exercise. Mansfield's unifying principle turns
on what he calls the "constitutional philosophy," an intriguing concept he
does not define but says is definable. 3 Other suggestions will doubtless be
made.
This article neither suggests a unifying principle nor tenders a compre-
hensive definition of religion. It takes a long view of the law of church and
8. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 817 (1984).
9. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
PITTr. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980); Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and
the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 849 (1984).
10. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
il. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962), first published in Kurland, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1961).
12. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964) (author examined implications of
doctrine with respect to current church problems); Choper, supra note 9, at 675 (establishment
clause should forbid only government action likely to impair freedom by coercing beliefs);
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981) (different rights
protected by each clause); Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Under-
standing of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 805 (1978) (fundamental
principle underlying both clauses is protection of individual choice); Note, Reinterpreting the
Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1468 (1984); Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1175 (1983).
13. Mansfield, supra note 9, at 858, 906. According to Professor Mansfield, the Constitution
is not neutral in regard to human nature and the meaning of life. There is, rather, a philosophy
that addresses these fundamental matters and deals with the proper exercise of governmental
power.
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state, and seeks to provide a perspective for viewing the present and antic-
ipating the future.
America is passing a critical intersection and taking a new direction in'the
law of church and state. This article describes the nature and causes of that
new direction and where it is leading us.
I. SEPARATION AND ACCOMMODATION
To use the familiar vernacular, "separation" is giving way to "accom-
modation." The dividing line between church and state, once a "wall ...
high and impregnable,"'14 is now a hedge low-lying and penetrable.' 5
The current transition to accommodation has two aspects, which correspond
to the two commands in the religion clause of the first amendment. Not
surprisingly, courts are softening both commands. The judicial prohibition
against an establishment of religion is relaxing. This allows an increase in
the extent of permissible government support of religion. 6 Courts are also
weakening the guarantee of free exercise of religion. Religious organizations
are subject to more regulation and taxation, and religious-based exemptions
from laws of general application are on the decline. 7
For purposes of this analysis, one may visualize the relationship between
the divergent commands of non-establishment and free exercise in terms of
a beam scale, as portrayed in the familiar scales of justice. The two scale
pans receive the force of the countervailing commands of non-establishment
and free exercise. This article suggests that forces in law or
public policy tend to balance this scale in equilibrium. When some force
increases the weight on one side of the scale, a state of equilibrium will be
restored by a corresponding increase on the other side. Therefore, when non-
establishment law permits an increase in government support of religion,
free exercise law soon restores the equilibrium by permitting an increase in
government regulation and taxation of religion. A similar result occurs when
the sequence is reversed.
Under this metaphor, "separation" and "accommodation" represent the
total weight on the scales, although these labels are logically related to the
establishment side. Thus, "separation" signifies a minimum quantity of
government support of religion, and a corresponding minimum amount of
government regulation and taxation. Non-establishment and free exercise are
14. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947).
15. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1359 (1984), the Supreme Court declared that
the "wall" metaphor is "not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the
relationship." See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination
of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REv. 645, 646-50. Reservations about the
appropriateness of Jefferson's metaphor were expressed twenty-two years ago: "The modern
popularity of the wall metaphor should not conceal its inappropriateness as an expression of
current church-state relationships . . . . Indeed, the metaphor may have its highest and best
use as the title of a book." THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 2-3 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
16. See infra notes 52-87 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
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in their most rigorous state. The scales are in balance, and the relationship
is in equilibrium.
"Accommodation" signifies a condition where the weight of government
support has been increased. Such an increase is followed by, or follows, a
comparable increase in the extent of government regulation and/or taxation.
The accommodation equilibrium represents increased weight on both sides
of the scales: government support on one side and regulation and taxation
on the other. Stated otherwise, acommodation represents a relaxation of
both the non-establishment and free exercise commands of the religion clause.
There are many unanswered questions regarding the transition from sep-
aration to accommodation. Which side of the scales is affected first, and
what accounts for the equilibrium in the hypothesis? Do changes in the level
of government support cause comparable changes in the level of regulation
or taxation, as the sequence seems to suggest? Or is the relationship the
reverse? Or are both changes produced by some third force?
Even when changes in legal rules or results move sequentially, it is difficult
to identify the causes of change.' 8 In fact, it is not certain what produces
the equilibrium in this hypothesis. It may be as simple as the common-sense
operation of accountability and fairness: what government supports it reg-
ulates or taxes, and, on the other hand, what government regulates or taxes
it will also support, directly or indirectly. Perhaps the most likely explanation
is that the movement from separation to accommodation between church
and state is produced by forces outside that relationship.
A. The Change From Separation To Accommodation
The change in emphasis from separation to accommodation seems to be
a consequence of two interrelated developments of the last half-century: the
expansion in the role of government, and the changing definition of religion.
1. The Role of Government
During our lifetimes we have seen increased government regulation of
relationships and activities in which churches engage in approximately the
same way as other organizations and individuals. These relationships and
activities include employment relations, commercial exchanges, financing,
and the use of land or other property. The vision of those who devise and
administer such regulations is shaped to their subject matter. For this purpose
the regulatory vision detects little or no difference in whether the regulated
activity involves a religious institution or not. Thus, those who regulate
employment relationships tend to look at a church employer like any other
employer. It is difficult to persuade regulators that religious institutions should
have special exemptions. As a result, the regulatory burden on churches has
18. E.g., D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 154-65
(1968); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665,
678-709 (1970) (presenting empirical evidence on effect of the exclusionary rule on law enforce-
ment personnel).
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tended to increase along with the regulatory burden on others.
We have also seen increased regulation of the unique activities of all non-
profit organizations, such as charitable solicitation and financial disclosure.
Laws restricting tax exemptions for non-profit organizations have also af-
fected churches. Although these kinds of changes typically are not aimed at
churches as such, they inevitably enlarge the area of the tender interface
between church and state.
Finally, as the scope of government has increased, federal, state, and local
governments more and more have become a competitor of churches. This
has increased church-state conflicts in such areas as education, hospitaliza-
tion, adoption, counseling, and other social services.
The expanding interface of religion and government has increased the
practical difficulty of what may be termed the "separation equilibrium" and
also has enhanced the relative attractiveness of what may be called the
"accommodation equilibrium."
2. "Religion" Defined
Despite over a century of religion clause litigation, the United States
Supreme Court has never articulated a consistent workable definition of
"religion."' 9 Scholarly literature, however, is abundant. E0 Most commenta-
tors acknowledge the need for a definition of religion, although one recent
article labeled the definitional search "misguided." ' 2' While most authors
19. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
20. On the definition of religion for purposes of the first amendment, see generally P.
KAUPER, supra note 12, at 22-34; Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional
Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479, 488-89 (1968); Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution:
A Classification Problem, I I VAL. U.L. REV. 163, 198, 223 (1977); Choper, Defining "Religion"
in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L.F. 579; Freeman, The Misguided Search for the
Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Greenawalt, Religion as a
Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 (1984); Johnson, supra note 8;
Mansfield, supra note 9; Merel, supra note 12, at 829-41; Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder,
and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 355-64; Rabin,
When Is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise,
51 CORNELL L.Q. 231 (1966); Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar: Defining "Religion"for Purposes
of Administering Religion-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 219 (1983);
Comment, The Unseen Regulator: The Role of Characterization in First Amendment Free
Exercise Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME LAW. 978 (1984); Comment, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining
Religion Under the Constitution, 31 EMORY L.J. 974 (1982); Comment, Defining Religion: Of
God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 533, 542 (1965); Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978); Note, Belief in God and
Transcendental Meditation: The Problem of Defining Religion in the First Amendment, 3 PACE
L. REV. 147 (1982); Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition of
Religion, 61 TEX. L. REv. 139 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Sacred and the Profane];
Note, Objective Criteria for Defining Religion for the First Amendment-Malnak v. Yogi, I I
U. TOL. L. REV. 988 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Objective Criteria for Defining Religion];
Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities,
90 YALE L.J. 350, 370 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause].
21. Freeman, supra note 20. "There simply is no essence of religion, no single feature or
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acknowledge the need for a single definition, a significant body of opinion
advocates different definitions of "religion" for different purposes. 22
The most radical version of the multiple definition theory maintains that
"religion" should be defined entirely in subjective terms. Under this ap-
proach, "religion" would encompass any belief or activity which an inter-
ested organization or individual designated as being "religious." 23 It is
inevitable and desirable that the definition of religion would have some
subjective element. However, a definition that is entirely or even predominantly
subjective is unworkable in a constitutional context that imposes special
burdens on, and extends significant advantages to, something that is termed
"religion." The religion clause could be rendered either all-inclusive or prac-
tically meaningless if the government could not identify some objectively
defined category of activities and organizations for special treatment.
A second and more seductive example of the multiple definition theory
asserts that religion has different meanings for purposes of the guarantee
of free exercise than for the prohibition against establishment. 24 But despite
the tendency of courts and commentators to speak of two religion clauses,25
there is actually only one, and the term "religion" occurs just once in that
clause. There are obvious interpretive problems in deriving two different
meanings from the same word in one clause. More importantly, if religion
does not have a single definition, the meaning of the religion clause's vital
commands and guarantees could be manipulated according to whether the
issue was characterized as free exercise or establishment. 26
The definition of religion is a crucial factor in the law of church and
state. The area of confrontation between church and state grows as the
number of organizations and types of activities included within the definition
of religion increases. Increased confrontation between church and state
will intensify pressure to relax the prohibition against government support
of religion. Thus, the more inclusive the definition of religion, the greater
the pressure for accommodation. A larger area of confrontation will also
set of features that all religions have in common and that distinguishes religion from everything
else. There is only a focus coupled with a set of paradigmatic features." Id. at 1565. Dean
Choper, however, concedes the need for a definition, but argues that the content and application
of the substantive rules should be such that the definition is of limited significance. Choper,
supra note 20, at 580, 612.
22. See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
23. Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point? 1966 Wis. L.
REV. 217, 264; Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J.
593, 604 (1964).
The subjective definition was expressly rejected in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-
16 (1972). See Note, Objective Criteria for Defining Religion, supra note 20, at 1007; Note,
The Sacred and the Profane, supra note 20, at 161. The subjective approach is at least impliedly
rejected by every effort to formulate an objective definition. See authorities cited supra note 20.
24. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 828 (1978); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686-87 n.14 (1969); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition
of Religion, supra note 20, at 1083-86, 1088-89.
25. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
26. Johnson, supra note 8, at 821-22.
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tend to weaken the guarantee against government regulation and taxation of
religion.
a. "Religion" and the Guarantee of Free Exercise
For purposes of the guarantee of free exercise, the definition of religion
has moved from theism to "ultimate-concern" philosophy. 27 In 1890 the
Supreme Court defined religion as "one's views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will."12 In 1931 Chief Justice Hughes
wrote for himself and Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis that "the essence
of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation. ' 29 In the famous 1947 Everson opinion, 0
however, Justice Black included "non-believers" in his listing of various
denominations and categories of religion.
The significance of including non-believers in the definition of religion
became apparent in Torcaso v. Watkins,3 in which an election candidate
challenged a Maryland statute that forced candidates to declare their belief
in God as a condition for public office. The Supreme Court invalidated the
statute, and applied a broad definition of religion that had far-reaching
consequences for purposes of free exercise:
Neither [a State nor the Federal Government] can constitutionally pass
laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.3 2
The Supreme Court applied this broadened definition of religion in the
interpretation of the statutes on conscientious objection to military service.
The draft laws exempted persons whose objections to war resulted from
"religious training and belief." Congress had defined that term as "belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation," and had expressly ruled out an exemption based
on beliefs that were "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical." 33
Nevertheless, in United States v. Seeger, the Supreme Court held that the
draft-law exemption also applied to a man who disclaimed any guidance
from God. 4 The Court defined the necessary belief in a "Supreme Being"
27. See Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031-37 (3d Cir. 1981)
(proposing "broad, non-theistic" definition of religion for purposes of free exercise claim). See
generally authorities cited supra note 20.
28. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
29. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
30. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
31. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
32. Id. at 495 (footnotes omitted).
33. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 (current version at 50 U.S.C.
App. § 4560) (1976)).
34. 380 U.S. 163 (1964). See also Rabin, supra note 20.
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under the draft law to include "a sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God
of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption . . . . " Under Seeger,
religious belief is not so much a matter of content as a matter of sincerity.
A few years later the Court expanded its statutory definition to include
intensely held beliefs "purely ethical or moral in source."13 6 Many scholars
interpret these decisions as expressing constitutional as well as statutory
construction, at least with reference to free exercise." In this manner, the
first amendment's guarantee of free exercise of "religion" has been expanded
from the traditional limits of theism to include the sincere free exercise of
philosophy-religious, anti-religious, or otherwise.
The problem with a definition of religion that includes almost everything is
that the practical effect of inclusion comes to mean almost nothing. Free
exercise protections become diluted as their scope becomes more diffuse.
When religion has no more right to free exercise than irreligion or any other
secular philosophy, the whole newly expanded category of "religion" is
likely to diminish in significance. 8 This has already happened.
b. "Religion" and the Prohibition Against Establishment
In contrast, for purposes of the prohibition against government establish-
ment, religion has retained its traditional theistic connotations of worship
and belief in God.39 The legal gatekeeper for this part of the wall between
church and state has blocked any government traffic that would not pass
the three-prong test for establishment: a secular legislative purpose, a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and an administration that
does not foster excessive government "entanglement" with religion.40 The
irony of this three-prong test is that, as applied, it has screened out govern-
ment support for only that form of religion which fits under the traditional
theistic definition. No other philosophy or value system among those enjoying
35. 380 U.S. at 176.
36. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340, 342-43 (1970). See also Bowser, supra note
20, at 167-81; Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious
Objection, in CHURCH AND STATE-THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 168, 172-
84 (P. Kurland ed. 1975); Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. Ill5, 1136
(1973); Comment, "Mind Control" or Intensity of Faith: The Constitutional Protection of
Religious Beliefs, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 751, 757-59 (1978).
37. E.g., Freeman, supra note 20, at 1528; Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 760; Rabin, supra
note 20, at 1136.
38. See Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection: Antiquated Oddity or Vital
Reality? 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 15, 41 (1973).
39. See generally authorities cited supra note 20. See Oaks, Religion and Law in the
Eighties, in BELIEF, FAITH AND REASON (1981) (address to the Philadelphia Society, 1980), also
published as an Ethics and Public Policy Reprint (1981).
40. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). See
also Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final Installment? 1973 SuP.
CT. REV. 57, 71-77.
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the expanded guarantee of free exercise has had to pass this test. Notwith-
standing the comprehensive belief systems and the religious fervor of those
who have promoted secular humanism, environmentalism, behaviorism, or
other theories of value or human behavior, their causes have received gov-
ernment support without having to pass the three-prong test. Only traditional
theistic religion has been banished from the "public square. ' 4
The Supreme Court has never explained why religion has a broad non-
theistic meaning for purposes of free exercise and a narrow theistic meaning
for purposes of non-establishment. 2 There are many scholarly works on the
definition of religion under the first amendment, 43 but most deal with religion
for purposes of free exercise and gloss over the awkward fact that the same
definition does not apply to establishment.
In the long run we have a right to expect that the United States Supreme
Court will formulate a definition of religion that can be applied to both the
guarantee of free exercise and the prohibition of non-establishment. The
language of the religion clause dictates a common definition, and fairness
and practicality demand it.
Theoretically, a common definition could be achieved if the Court would
return to its original theistic definition. 44 A return to the original definition
would limit the number of organizations and beliefs to which the religion
clause applies. The consensus of knowledgeable commentary considers this
alternative unlikely, since it would be unacceptable to exclude non-theistic
eastern religions and emerging systems of philosophical belief from the
protections of the first amendment.4 5 This consensus has undeniable force.
The more likely alternative for uniformity is for the Supreme Court to
formulate a comprehensive definition of religion analogous to the broad
non-theistic definition it has applied in free exercise cases. There is, however,
a problem with this non-theistic alternative. A broad definition of religion
41. R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984).
42. As Professor Richard E. Morgan noted, the Court has never reconciled "its strictness
as to establishment with its permissiveness as to free exercise." Morgan, supra note 40, at 97.
43. See supra note 20.
44. For a case applying a theistic definition of religion and expressly rejecting one that
would include "all other beliefs and philosophies," see South Place Ethical Society, Barralet
and others v. Attorney General and others, [1980] 3 All. E.R. 918, 924, noted in Hofler,
Religion, Sanity and the Law, 131 NEW L.J. 761 (1981).
Some observers have argued that the Yoder and Thomas cases indicate a trend back toward
a theistic definition. See Slye, supra note 20, at 234, 238-39; Note, The Sacred and the Profane,
supra note 20, at 149-51, 155-56.
45. See, e g., Choper, supra note 20, at 579-80 (definition of religion hindered by unprof-
itable results, potential judicial preference to certain groups, and possible violations of the first
amendment); Johnson, supra note 8, at 832-33 (lack of uniform concept of religion prohibits
attempt to define); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 20, at
1072-75 (government defines religion on basis of own parochial experience leading to arbitrary
exclusion); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause, supra note 20, at 362-
64 (definition of religion difficult because nontheistic religions like Buddhism neither recognize
influences on human behavior, belief, and adherence to principles nor common source of
authority).
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when applied to the current rules prohibiting the "establishment" of religion
would drive government out of some areas of activity where its sponsorship,
support, and influence are now pervasive. Under a broad definition of
religion, the traditional rules against establishment might bar the government
not only from sponsoring educational activity involving religious or philo-
sophical values, but also from taking actions overtly based on such values. 46
If applied to anti-establishment, a broad definition of religion would so
enlarge the area of interface between church and state that the current rules
against government support of religion might lead to a paralyzing tangle of
litigation that could put a host of government programs in jeopardy. 47 The
obvious corrective for this unacceptable prospect is for the substantive rules
against the establishment of religion to relax to the point that both religion
and government can co-exist along the enlarged border of interface.4B
When this hypothesis was first suggested,49 the best authority offered for
the relaxation of the prohibition against establishment was Walz v. Tax
Commission, 0 in which the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality
of real estate tax exemptions that included churches. Further authority
included scholarly articles that saw signs of increased tolerance for govern-
ment support of religion." Today the trend toward relaxation of the pro-
hibition of establishment is pronounced, and it has a name: accommodation.
II. TREND UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In the last four years, the United States Supreme Court has decided six
major cases in which state support or other state action was challenged
under the establishment clause. In four of these cases the Court rejected the
46. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 827-28 ("in the age of. the affirmative and
increasingly pervasive state, a less expansive notion of religion was required for establishment
clause purposes lest all 'humane' programs of government be deemed constitutionally suspect");
Note, Objective Criteria For Defining Religion, supra note 20, at 1012; Hogan, "Sorry, No
Teaching of Values allowed," New York Times, May 20, 1979, at E21. See also THE WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 15, at 5 ("In recent years there have been repeated
reminders that irreligion demands the protection of the free-exercise phrase; the irreligious must
be equally willing to accept the proscriptions of non-establishment").
47. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 20, at 1082-84.
48. Chopt,', supra note 20, at 591-613. Dean Choper illustrates this tendency by proposing
substantive rules which minimize the necessity for defining religion.
49. Oaks, supra note 39.
50. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
51. See, e.g., Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 708-37 (1968); Schotten, The Establishment Clause and Excessive Governmental
Religious Entanglement: The Constitutional Status of Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Sec-
ondary Schools, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207, 236-44 (1979); Note, Government Neutrality
and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax Credits, 92 HAsv. L. REv. 696, 717 (1979).
See also Merel, supra note 12, at 822 (advocating "a narrowly drawn test-not of religion, but
of establishment").
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challenge.52 The remaining two cases" involved uncommon factual circum-
stances and rules of law that are unlikely to spawn numerous progeny. In
view of the outcome and the reasoning of these most recent establishment
clause cases, it is not surprising that the commentators, including Dean Jesse
Choper5 4 are declaring the total inadequacy or imminent demise of the three-
prong test." The establishment clause cases yet to be decided by the Supreme
are expected to reinforce this trend.
The four recent cases that rejected the establishment challenge are fraught
with implications for the future. In three of these cases the court sustained
state support of religion through an extremely lenient interpretation of its
three-prong test, which had been used previously to invalidate most types
of government support. In the fourth case, the Court ignored the three-
prong test entirely and simply relied on a tradition of accommodation in a
particular area.
In Widmar v. Vincent,5 6 the Supreme Court held that there was no
establishment clause violation when a public university that had opened its
facilities for use by student groups allowed one such group to hold a
voluntary religious service. The Court reasoned that religious worship was a
form of communication that was protected by the speech and association
provisions of the first amendment.5 7 Such protected activity could not be
abridged without a compelling state interest. 5 The state would have a
compelling interest in denying equal access to religious assemblies if such
support would constitute a forbidden establishment of religion. 9 The Court
held that the State did not have a compelling interest because, inter alia,
religious meetings on public premises did not have the "primary effect" of
advancing religion. 60 The Court justified this conclusion with reasoning that
52. See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
54. Speech by Dean Jesse Choper, Professor of Law and Dean of the School of Law,
University of California at Berkeley, The Free Exercise Clause: A Re-examination of the Ex-
isting Structure (Nov. 17, 1983). See also Choper, supra note 9 (Court-developed establishment
clause three-prong test directly conflicts with the free exercise clause balancing test).
55. See Dunsford, Prayer in the Well: Some Heretical Reflections on the Establishment
Syndrome, 1984 UTAH L. REV. I, 9, 16 (cases involving establishment clause lack uniformity);
Johnson, supra note 8, at 826-31 (the concepts of religious purpose, effect and entanglement
"do not help us decide where to draw the line"); Mansfield, supra note 9, at 848 (three-prong
test does not help in "understanding what is really at stake"); Van Alstyne, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984
DUKE L.J. 770, 783 (three-prong approach described as "any more than" test). The entanglement
test is criticized in Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of
the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980), and
Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA
L. REV. 1195 (1980).
56. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
57. Id. at 269.
-58. Id. at 270.
59. Id. at 271.
60. Id. at 273.
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is potentially far-reaching. The benefit of equal access was available to a
broad class of organizations-nonreligious as well as religious-and the
establishment clause does not bar "the extension of general benefits to
religious groups .... -6, Counsel for the state later characterized this rea-
soning as "the beginning of the death march for the establishment provision
of the first amendment .. "62
In Mueller v. Allen, 63 the Supreme Court did not find an establishment
clause prohibition against state tax deductions for tuition and other educa-
tional expenses paid for public and private schools, including parochial
schools. Once again, the Court applied the three-prong test leniently. The
Court did not even consider evidence on whether the primary effect of the
statute, as applied, benefitted religious schools, since the law was facially
neutral as to all types of schools. 64
In Marsh v. Chambers,65 the Supreme Court held that the State of Ne-
braska did not violate the establishment prohibition when it paid the salary
of a chaplain to offer prayers in its legislative assembly. The Court's opinion
ignored the three-prong test. Just as it did in sustaining real estate tax
exemptions in Walz, the Court relied on "the weight to be accorded to
history. '" 66 The opinion noted that ever since the founding of the republic
"the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of dises-
tablishment and religious freedom." ' 6 One learned commentator promptly
contended that the Supreme Court's reasoning and result in this case exposed
the infirmities in each element of its three-prong test. 6 He boldly called for
abolishing the three-prong test and overruling Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, the fountainhead of the separationist philosophy, calling that opinion
"shabby history and unacceptable legal analysis." ' 69
61. Id. at 274.
62. Ayres, Widmar v. Vincent: The Beginning of the End for the Establishment Clause, 8
J.C. & U.L. 511, (1981-82).
63. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
64. See generally Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury After Taxation with Repre-
sentation of Washington, Mueller and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 275, 290 (stating that
Mueller overruled Nyquist).
65. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
66. Id. at 3334.
67. Id. at 3333.
68. Dunsford, supra note 54, at 2.
69. Id. at 20. See also M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); Johnson, supra note 8, at 817; Mansfield, supra note 9, at
847.
Taking his cue from Judge Brevard Hand's widely noted opinion in Jaffree v. Board of
School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), rev'd, 705 F.2d
1526 (l1th Cir. 1983), another observer has proposed resurrecting an even more radical basis
for overruling Everson: since the fourteenth amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights,
the establishment clause is therefore not a limitation on state power. James McClellan, Hand's
Writing on the Wall of Separation (paper delivered at American Enterprise Institute conference,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 9, 1985).
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The fourth recent case to reject an establishment clause argument is Lynch
v. Donnelly."0 Lynch involved a challenge to a Rhode Island city's inclusion
of a nativity scene in its annual Christmas display. Emboldened by the Marsh
decision, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief advocating abandonment
of the three-prong test in this case. Although the Court did not comment
expressly on the Solicitor General's argument, the analysis in Lynch clearly
relegated the three-prong test to the category of a "useful . . . inquir[y].""
In a passage one commentator promptly recognized as evidence that "an
altogether new test was aborning, ' 72 the opinion observes that the Court
has "repeatedly emphasized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any single
test or criterion in this sensitive area." 3 The opinion asserts that the Court
has "consistently" declined "to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Estab-
lishment Clause." '7 4 It is replete with references to government's "accom-
modation" of the religious beliefs and practices of its citizens. In one
especially significant sentence, the Court declares that the Constitution does
not "require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively man-
dates accommodation not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any. '"75
The rationale in Lynch is a far cry from the separationist philosophy
of Everson. As one critic noted, by the standards of Everson, "[tihe wall
of separation between church and state had clearly been breached ' 7 6 by the
city's sponsorship of the nativity scene, in preference to the symbols of other
faiths.
Daniel Boorstin has observed that "Americans have a habit of writing
premature obituaries. 7 7 Even if this is so, there is no need for the Supreme
Court to inter the three-prong test when it has already been displaced so
prominently. With the °Court's recharacterization of that test as merely a
"useful inquiry" and with its frequent approving references to "accommo-
dation," the Supreme Court seems to have adopted and named a new
philosophy under the establishment clause. Unfortunately, the Court has not
yet succeeded in articulating the underlying principles to define the limits of
government support under this new philosophy.
The two recent Supreme Court cases that overturned state action on the
basis of the establishment clause preceded the four cases discussed above.
More important, their reasoning is not contrary to this analysis.
In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.7 8 the Court struck down a state law that
gave churches a veto power over the issuance of liquor licenses to operate within
70. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
71. Id. at 1362.
72. Van Alstyne, supra note 54, at 783.
73. 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
74. Id. at 1361.
75. Id. at 1359.
76. Van Alstyne, supra note 54, at 781.
77. A Report from the Librarian of Congress, BOOKS IN OUR FUTURE 3 (Joint Committee
on the Library, Congress of the United States, 1984).
78. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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a particular radius of the church. The Court held that this delegation of
governmental power to churches constituted a fusion of government and
religious functions that inescapably violated the establishment clause.19
In Larson v. Valente," ° the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the
Minnesota Charitable Solicitations Act that imposed registration and re-
porting requirements on religious organizations, but exempted those orga-
nizations receiving more than fifty percent of their support from their own
members. The major principle the Court stated for this decision was "that
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." ' ,
This principle of non-preference is surely subject to some exceptions-at
least those of a historic and symbolic or de minimis character-in view of
the Court's subsequent approval of a nativity scene on public property.8 2
The Larson opinion contains a puzzling mixture of non-establishment and
free exercise analysis."3 Thus, it makes incidental references to "entangle-
ment," one of the three-prong tests, but it also contains an extended dis-
cussion of compelling state interest, a test not previously associated with
establishment analysis. 84
The Larson opinion cries for further clarification. This may be provided
most sensibly by conceding the merit of Dean Choper's conclusion.85 He
contended that Larson should have been analyzed not as a prohibited
establishment, but as a challenged regulation of religion. The statute was
invalidated as a violation of free exercise because it was neither justified by
a compelling state interest nor implemented by the least restrictive means.
In summary, the Supreme Court's de-emphasis of its three-prong test, its
adoption of "accommodation" in the rhetoric of its opinions, and its recent
succession of holdings rejecting challenges to government support, all indicate
that the Supreme Court is relaxing the establishment clause prohibition. The
separationist ideology, which Richard Neuhaus characterizes as having moved
us from "government neutrality toward religion, to government hostility to
religion,"18 6 seems to be giving way to a philosophy of accommodation. This
modification may permit a more public role for religion. If so, and if citizens
of different faiths can join hearts and hands as one people under God, we
may yet, as Neuhaus advocates, "become partners in rearticulating the
religious base of the democratic experiment.""
79. Id. at 126.
80. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
81. Id. at 244.
82. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
83. Id. at 1358.
84. Id. at 1362.
85. Choper speech, supra note 53.
86. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 41, at 148.
87. Id. at 264.
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III. TREND UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The other half of the hypothesis-that the guarantee of free exercise is
also weakening-is probably less obvious. There is evidence for this thesis
in two areas. The first area involves increased taxation of churches and
religious activities. The second area involves increased regulation of churches
and of individual actions that are motivated by religious belief. The area of
increased regulation suggests that the Supreme Court is retreating from its
recent generosity in approving religious exemptions from laws of general
application.
A. Taxation
The trend of legislative and administrative action is to impose additional
taxes on religious organizations. Ever in need of revenues, state and local
governments are tightening the noose on religious exemptions from real
estate taxes. The administration of traditional exemptions is becoming more
stringent, as reflected in stricter interpretations of qualifying provisions
like "used exclusively for . . . religious worship. 8 8 More states are requiring
annual exemption certificates that require churches to disclose their finances
and report on the use of exempt properties. Additionally, more local gov-
ernments are imposing "benefit" or "special district" taxes, which charge
church properties for the use of government services. 9
Congress has recently removed churches' traditional exemption from pay-
roll taxes, which is the area of greatest and most consistent increase in
federal taxation. Significantly, no congressional leaders suggested any con-
stitutional problem with this amendment, even though it ef-
fectively imposed a direct tax on an essential function of religious
organizations, the employment of personnel. 90 The constitutionality of this
new payroll tax on churches has not yet been tested, but a recent Supreme
Court decision suggests that it would be upheld.
In United States v. Lee,9' Amish employers challenged the Social Security,
tax as a violation of their free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court
rejected this challenge, reasoning that in an organized society which must
preserve operating latitude for its legislature, "some religious practices [must]
yield to the common good." 92 "The state may justify a limitation on religious
88. E.g., In re Loyal Order Of Moose, #259 v. County Board of Equalization, 546 P.2d
257 (Utah 1982).
89. See Serritella, Real Property Tax Exemption-Current Trends At the State Level, 26
CATH. LAW. 236, 242-43 (1981); Real Property Tax Exemptions for Religious Organizations,
47 ALB. L. REV. 1117, 1166-79 (1983).
90. The Social Security Amendments of 1983: A Tax on Religion, BENCHMARK, Jan./Feb.
1984, at 11-12. The origin of the federal tax exemption involving churches is described in THE
WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 15, at 9-10.
91. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
92. Id. at 259.
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liberty," the Court said, but it must show that such limitation "is
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." '93 The Court
then. held that the government's interest in maintaining a comprehensive
Social Security system outweighed the taxpayer's free exercise rights because
"mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social
security system . . . . 94 Congress and the courts must be "sensitive to the
needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause," the Court concluded, "but
every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising
every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs." 95
The principles declared in United States v. Lee portend great difficulty
for free exercise challenges to comprehensive government taxation schemes
that fall on religious organizations in the same manner as they fall on other
organizations similarly situated as to the tax involved.
B. Regulation and Exemptions Based on Religion
By any measure, the weight of government regulation of churches and
religious activities is increasing. Dean Kelly has observed that "only now are
we beginning to recognize that government intervention in religious affairs
is the largest, most nebulous, pervasive, and portentous religious-freedom
issue of our day." ' 96 Kelly gives more than a dozen illustrations. Whatever
the merit of any individual example, the trend is evident and ominous.
There will be more cases in which the Supreme Court sustains the regu-
lation of churches or religiously motivated behavior under laws affecting
activities that are religious for some and nonreligious for others. This includes
such efforts as administrative attempts to regulate the employment contracts
of parochial school teachers. The NLRB failed in such an attempt against
the Chicago Diocese, 97 but a state labor relations board recently succeeded
in such an effort against another diocese. 9 The Supreme Court recently
allowed the Minnesota State Fair to apply its "time, place, and manner"
regulations against charitable solicitations that were admittedly a first amend-
ment-protected religious practice of the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness.9 9 Cases like this, which present the issue of religious exemp-
tions from laws of general application, will certainly increase in number."
The extent of permissible regulation under the free exercise clause is also
being enlarged through manipulation of two important legal standards:
compelling state interest and least restrictive means. If the state's interest in
93. Id. at 257.
94. Id. at 258. See generally Schachner, supra note 64, at 280.
95. 455 U.S. at 261.
96. Kelly, Uncle Sam, Church Inspector, LIBERTY, May/June, 1984, at 3.
97. 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975), rev'd, Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112
(7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See also Laycock, supra note 12.
98. Catholic H.S. Ass'n of Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985).
99. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
100. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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a regulatory statute is defined in very general terms, such as compulsory
education or maintaining the integrity of the Social Security system, and is
then balanced against a narrow definition of the individual's interest, the
state's interest is much more likely to prevail. 0' Thus, in United States v.
Lee, 0 2 the Court concluded that the tax system as a whole could not function
if it tolerated exemptions for an Amish employer.'0 3 Because the state's in-
terest was defined in such grandiose terms, it was easy for the Court to
hold that it eclipsed the individual's free exercise claim.
In contrast, some of the Supreme Court's earlier free exercise cases have
insisted that individual and state interests be compared and balanced at
equivalent levels of generality. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' for example, the
Court balanced the free exercise interests of Amish students"5 not against
the state's general interest in compulsory education, but rather against the
state's marginal interest in compulsory education of Amish children after
the eighth grade. The comparison can also be distorted if a court fails to
insist on a showing that no less restrictive means are available to further a
compelling state interest that infringes on the free exercise of religion.' 6
The increase in permissible government support of religion under the
weakening establishment clause will expand the regulation of religious or-
ganizations and activities. Government will probably attempt to regulate,
directly or indirectly, whatever it subsidizes, directly or indirectly. Recent
Supreme Court decisions are consistent with this trend, and have strengthened
the theoretical basis for government regulation of churches and religious
activities. Two examples will suffice. One case involved the effect
of tax exemptions and deductions in general, and the other case applied this
principle in the specific context of an institution that should have been protected
under the free exercise clause.
Although not dealing with a church, Regan v. Taxation with
Representation"'7 strengthens the theoretical argument for regulating churches
on the basis of the benefit they derive from tax exemptions or from the tax
deductions taken by their contributors. Taxation with Representation held
that a federal tax exemption could be denied to a non-profit organization
that had engaged in the type of lobbying activities which exempt organizations
are prohibited from pursuing. 0 The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument
101. Pepper, supra note 20, at 341-44.
102. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
103. Id. at 260. The employer claimed that he was "self-employed" and thus exempt from
certain taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1976 Supp. Ill). Id. at 254-55.
104. 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972).
105. The free exercise interest was not of the child but was actually that of the parent, along
with the "traditional interest" of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children. Id. at 214.
106. Pepper, supra note 20, at 343.
107. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
108. Id. at 544.
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that the lobbying restriction violated its free speech rights. The Court held
that the Constitution did not require Congress to subsidize lobbying efforts.,"'9
As an essential element in the decision, the Court declared that:
[bjoth tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is
administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same
effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would
have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash
grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's contributions. 1°
Some government officials will interpret this passage as an invitation to
subject churches and religious activities to the same regulations currently
imposed on organizations that receive direct government appropriations or
subsidies.
The initial case involving a conflict between tax exemption requirements
and the guarantee of free exercise of religion is Bob Jones University v.
United States.'" In Bob Jones, the Court sustained the denial of tax exempt
status to a church-related university that discriminated on the basis of race."2
In the absence of express Congressional action, the Court relied on the
Internal Revenue Service's definition of the public policy applicable to tax
exemption." 3 By holding that the university's right to the free exercise of
religion must yield to administrative action in Bob Jones, the Court seems to
have signaled a clear diminution in the dimensions of the consititutional
guarantee of free exercise of religion, It remains to be seen whether that
diminution will apply to public-policy-based regulations other than the racial
discrimination to which the Bob Jones opinion was expressly limited. In view
of the Supreme Court's increased tolerance for indirect government support of
religion, exemplified in such cases as Mueller v. Allen, ' 4 the number of instances
in which churches or religious institutions will be expected to conform to public
policies articulated by government action are bound to increase." 5
109. Id. at 550.
110. Id. at 544. See also Schachner, supra note 64, at 282.
I11. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
112. Id. at 2036.
113. Though conceding the inevitability of its result, commentators have criticized the rea-
soning of the Bob Jones case for taking its public policy from administrative action and
Congressional inaction, and for its probable tendency to erase the historic line between state
action and private action, an essential distinction in a pluralistic society. E.g., Freed & Polsby,
Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 5-20.
114. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
115. As one commentator noted:
The ultimate result of Mueller, therefore, will be increased reliance by religious
organizations on governmental financial assistance. Additionally, byallowing gov-
ernments to condition assistance to religious organizations that are not 'purely
religious' on the observance by those organizations of public policies, and to closely
scrutinize the activities of the recipient organizations, Bob Jones will lead to an
unhealthy degree of governmental supervision of religious organizations seeking to
retain governmental assistance.
Schachner, supra note 64, at 311-12.
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In contrast to the manner in which Mueller, Taxation with Representation,
and Bob Jones increase the bases for federal regulation, there has been no
comparable enlargement in the bases for regulation of churches by state
governments. The California legislature recently provided an important bell-
wether against state regulation when it repudiated its Attorney General's
attempt to impose a general regulatory scheme on churches. As has been
shown, the charitable trust theory on which the California Attorney General
mounted its assault on the free exercise of religion in that instance was entirely
without foundation in the common law." 6 Hopefully, the books have been
closed on the assertion of that basis for state regulation.
Controversies over attempts to regulate churches or religious activities
often arise in the context of claims to exemptions from laws of general
application. Such exemptions are claimed on the basis that the application
of such laws to religious organizations or the religiously-motivated actions
of believers would violate the free exercise of religion. Claims of this
character have involved such familiar subjects as laws regulating crimes,
taxation, and employment, and such unfamiliar and diverse subjects as the
laws governing prison discipline, snake-handling, and malpractice by cler-
gymen. 117
In Reynolds v. United States,"18 decided in 1878, the Supreme Court
established the direction of the law of free exercise as it pertains to claims
for religious exemption. The Reynolds Court rejected a Mormon's asserted
exemption from a law which outlawed the practice of polygamy in the
territories.' 9 This pattern of hostility to religious exemptions continued until
as recently as 1961. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 20 the Court upheld the appli-
cation of a Sunday closing law to Orthodox Jews, rejecting the argument
that because their religion commanded them to close on Saturday they should
have an exemption to do business on Sunday.
In the subsequent two decades, however, the Supreme Court reversed its
direction, and favored some religious exemptions. 2' In 1963, the Court
granted a claim of exemption in Sherbert v. Verner,'22 holding that a Seventh-
day Adventist could not be disadvantaged under state unemployment com-
pensation laws because he would not work on his sabbath. This type of
exemption was reaffirmed in 1981 in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana.'3
116. Oaks, Trust Doctrines in Church Controversies, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 805.
117. See generally Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause, supra note
20, at 35 1-52 (lists claims for religious exceptions); Note, The Sacred and the Profane, supra
note 20, at 139 n.3; Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL.
U.L. REV. 163 (1981) (clergyman malpractice expanded with respect to elements of cause of
action for negligence).
118. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
119. Id. at 166-67.
120. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
121. P. KAUPER, supra note 12, at 41-44; Pepper, supra note 20, at 330-45.
122. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
123. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (exemption sought by Jehovah's Witness who refused to work in
a department producing weapons).
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Another important religious exemption was granted in 1972 in Wisconsin v.
Yoder. 24 In Yoder the Court held that a state could not apply its criminal
penalty to punish Amish parents who kept their children out of school after
the eighth grade.' 25
Some authorities believe that this quarter-century of limited favoritism for
religious exemptions is nearly over. As Charles M. Whelan wrote several
years ago:
A small but growing number of religious leaders of all faiths fear that
the golden age of religious exemptions has ended. They believe that we
are already in the twilight of substantially increased government regula-
tion.
2 6
Three recent cases discussed earlier support that fear. In United States v.
Lee, "'27 decided in 1982, the Supreme Court refused to grant an exemption
to an Amish employer who had a religious objection to paying social security
taxes for his employees. Several commentators have noted that Lee seriously
qualifies the vitality of Sherbert and Thomas.' 8 In 1981, the Court decided
the Heffron case,' 2 9 which denied a religious exemption from the charitable
solicitation regulations of the Minnesota State Fair. In Bob Jones,30 decided
in 1983, the Court was almost peremptory in rejecting a church institution's
claims of religious exemption from the public policy forbidding racial dis-
crimination.
In terms of results, the tide seems to be turning against exemptions based
on religion. In fact, some scholars have criticized the whole concept of such
exemptions."' Other commentators have conceded that the Supreme Court has
not articulated a workable theory to explain which exemptions will be granted
and which will be denied, and have suggested alternative theories.' 32 Regardless
of the approach, exemptions based on religion are at least on the defensive.
124. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
125. Id. at 234.
126. Whelan, Government and the Church, AM., Dec. 16, 1978, at 450.
127. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
128. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263-64 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Mans-
field, supra note 9, at 901; Schachner, supra note 64, at 280; Note, United States v. Lee: An
Insensitive Approach to the Free Exercise of Religion, 18 TULSA L.J. 305, 324-35 (1982).
Sherbert is criticized on another basis in Laycock, supra note 12, at 1414.
129. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
130. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). See supra note Ill and
accompanying text.
131. M. MALBIN, supra note 69, at 40; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1313-14, 1322 (1970) (governments must not "go out
of their way" to favor or disfavor religion); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 16-17
(1978) (government inconsistently exempts some religious factions from activities and requires
compliance of other religious factions).
132. Freed & Polsby, supra note 113, at 29 ("bottom line" is no free exercise allowed);
Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause, supra note 20, at 362-69.
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Overall, the Supreme Court's new direction on free exercise and non-
establishment represents a movement toward what Michael J. Malbin's 1978
study represents as the intentions of the authors of the first amendment:
The modern Supreme Court correctly perceives that the framers wanted
to encourage religion. But the Court uses the free exercise clause to grant
religion special favors that the framers never thought were required, while
prohibiting the non-discriminatory assistance the framers would have per-
mitted .. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the modern law of church and state, the relationship between rules
forbidding establishment and guaranteeing free exercise may be visualized in
terms of a beam scale driven by forces that will keep the two sides
in balance. If the extent of permissible government support of religion
increases, the extent of permissible regulation and taxation of churches and
religious activities will also increase. The reverse is also true. Whatever forces
produce a change on either side, the relationship between the government
support side and the regulation-taxation side will be brought into equilibrium.
Until recently, the law of church and state was in a state of equilibrium
that emphasized separation. The scales now seem to be moving toward an
equlibrium that emphasizes accommodation. This new emphasis diminishes
the constitutional obstacle to government support for churches and religious
activities, and correspondingly diminishes the constitutional guarantees against
taxation and regulation. In this position, constitutional litigation will be a
less effective safeguard of free exercise, and churches and religious prac-
titioners will need to protect their interests more frequently through legislative
lobbying.
If the diminishing guarantees of first amendment free exercise provide a
less significant barrier to government action against churches and religious
activities, the robust first amendment free speech guarantees may take up a
portion of the slack. When the Supreme Court held in Widmar v. Vincent
that "religious worship and discussion" are "forms of speech and association
protected by the first amendment,"' 3 4 the Court may have positioned a
significant safety net for a portion of the free exercise of religion., While
free speech guarantees would protect words and acts that communicate
religious messages, there is substantial doubt about the extent to which the
less clearly defined freedom of "association" would protect religious auton-
omy and a host of other essential activities of churches and their adherents.
133. M. MALB N, supra note 69, at 40.
134. 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
135. Some commentators have argued that free exercise is simply a subspecies of the freedom
of expression. E.g., Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression,
67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 547 (1983) ("no more stringent protection [should] be allowed free
exercise claims than would be granted to comparable secular activity").
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A generalized (and secularized) guarantee of free "speech and association"
is not a substitute for the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion.
Just as the first amendment has separate clauses dealing with religion and
speech, the courts must preserve the principle that religious liberty is a
distinct value warranting independent and preferred protection.'
"Accommodation" does not mean that religion must "accommodate" to
the secular order by surrendering its unique role in society and by equating
the unique protection of "free exercise" of religion with the comprehensive
guarantee of free "speech and association." Religion must preserve its unique
status in our pluralistic society in order to make its unique contribution-
its recognition and commitment to values that transcend the secular world.
Accommodation signifies a closer relationship between church and state.
Religion cannot survive this closer relationship unless our legislative and
judicial lawmakers are committed to preserve the distinctive identity of
religion and to preserve the freedom necessary to make its unique contri-
bution.
The future will probably see religion defined under both phrases of
the Religion Clause in essentially the same terms as the current broad
definition that is now applied to free exercise. Even if the Supreme Court
never formulates uniform principles to reconcile the contrary demands of
non-establishment and free exercise, the pragmatic balance previously struck
in these areas will probably continue to move toward "accommodation."
"Accommodation" consists of increased support for religion and increased
taxation and regulation of churches and religious activities. Direct govern-
mental support will, of course, remain limited to reinforcing the generalized
piety that has been called "civil religion." Indirect support for religion will
increase, but it will not include overt and significant favoritism for one
particular denomination.
The sacramental and sacerdotal activities of churches and religious orga-
nizations are relatively safe from government regulation. Increases in taxation
and regulation are likely to bear most heavily on the "business" activities
of churches or religious organizations. These activities include employment
or the use of property, which are comparable to those activities conducted
by non-religious organizations. In any event, government regulation of church-
related activities and religiously motivated behavior is likely to be an area
of increasing conflict in years to come.
136. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 91-118 (1965); P. KAIUPER, supra note
12, at 13-44; Pfeffer, supra note 36; Saladin, Relative Ranking of the Preferred Freedoms:
Religion and Speech, 1964 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 149, 171 ("freedom of religion is
accorded the supreme place in the hierarchy of American civil rights").
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